拐點五 Turning Point V
1989
以退為進的世紀大局
A Century-Long Game of Strategic Retreat
1989
以退為進的世紀大局
A Century-Long Game of Strategic Retreat
1
1979 之後，中國全力做經濟。
從 1979 到 1989，整整十年。
這十年裡：家庭聯產承包責任制、經濟特區、個體戶、鄉鎮企業、價格雙軌制、外資進入。
中國的 GDP，從 1979 年的 1,782 億美元，漲到 1989 年的 3,475 億美元。
翻了一番。
After 1979, China shifted its full focus toward economic development.
From 1979 to 1989, for an entire decade.
During those ten years: the de-collectivization of agriculture, Special Economic Zones, private entrepreneurs, township and village enterprises, the dual-track pricing system, and the arrival of foreign investment.
China’s GDP grew from $178.2 billion in 1979 to $347.5 billion in 1989.
It doubled.
2
但十年高速發展，也帶來了問題。
通膨、官倒、分配不均、腐敗。
到了 1980 年代後期，中國國內出現了三層矛盾：
第一層：改革派和保守派的路線之爭。
第二層：官僚體系內部的腐敗問題。
第三層：知識分子和年輕一代對改革節奏的不滿。
But ten years of rapid growth also brought serious problems.
Inflation, profiteering by politically connected officials, inequality, and corruption.
By the late 1980s, three layers of internal tension had emerged in China:
First: a struggle between reformers and conservatives over the country’s direction.
Second: deepening corruption within the bureaucratic system.
Third: growing frustration among intellectuals and the younger generation over the pace of reform.
3
改革派和保守派的路線之爭，集中在兩位老人身上。
鄧小平——主張市場經濟，大膽改革。
陳雲——主張計劃經濟，穩中求進。
兩人都是中共元老，都是 1949 年建國的核心人物，也都是改革開放的奠基人。
兩人意見不同，爭論已久。
The struggle between reformers and conservatives centered around two elderly leaders.
Deng Xiaoping — who advocated market reforms and bold change.
Chen Yun — who favored a planned economy and a more cautious approach.
Both were party elders and central figures in the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949.
Both were architects of the reform era, but they saw China’s future differently.
The debate between them had lasted for years.
4
到了 1989 年，矛盾總爆發。
那一年的春夏之交，中國發生了一件大事。
事件本身，不在這一卷的範圍。
事件的後果，才是這一卷要擺的事。
By 1989, the tensions finally exploded.
In the late spring and early summer of that year, a major political crisis unfolded in China.
The event itself is not the focus of this chapter.
What matters here are the consequences that followed.
5
1989 年下半年到 1991 年，中國最高層做了一系列極不尋常的動作。
From the second half of 1989 through 1991, China’s top leadership carried out a series of highly unusual moves.
6
第一步：鄧陳兩老，同時退。
1989 年 11 月，鄧小平辭去中央軍委主席——他最後一個職務。
同年同月，陳雲辭去中央顧問委員會主任——他最後一個職務。
兩位歷史巨人，在同一個月，同時退出政治舞台。
Step One: Deng and Chen both stepped down.
In November 1989, Deng Xiaoping resigned as Chairman of the Central Military Commission — his final official position.
In that same month, Chen Yun resigned as Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission — also his final official position.
Two historical giants left the political stage in the exact same month.
7
這在中共歷史上，是極罕見的操作。
通常，這種級別的內部分歧，會以一方勝出、一方失敗收場。
但 1989 年，兩老同時退。
不是一方贏一方輸，是兩個人都退，讓位給下一代。
This was an extremely rare move in the history of the Chinese Communist Party.
Normally, a split at this level ends with one side winning and the other losing.
But in 1989, both elders stepped aside together.
It was not a matter of victory or defeat; both men withdrew and made room for the next generation.
8
這個動作的份量，留給讀者自己想。
The significance of this move is something readers can judge for themselves.
9
第二步：年輕領導上場。
接班的人是江澤民、李鵬、朱鎔基、胡錦濤（後來）。
這四個人有一個共同特質：
沒有強烈的個人魅力，沒有鮮明的路線標籤，沒有歷史包袱。
當他們上場時，在國際上幾乎沒有人聽過他們的名字。
Step Two: A younger generation took power.
The successors were Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, and Hu Jintao (later on).
These four men shared one common trait:
No overwhelming personal charisma, no sharply defined ideological identity, and no major historical baggage.
When they first appeared on the world stage, few people outside China had even heard their names.
10
這是巧合嗎？
也許是，也許不是。
這個，小雷只擺出來。
Was this a coincidence?
Maybe, maybe not.
Tiger Lyon is simply placing the pieces on the table.
11
第三步：蘇聯散了。
1991 年 12 月 25 日，蘇聯正式解體。
中國一夜之間，失去了最後一個意識形態盟友。
Step Three: The Soviet Union collapsed.
On December 25, 1991, the USSR officially dissolved.
Overnight, China lost its last major ideological ally.
12
但同時，美國一夜之間失去了最大假想敵。
美國的注意力，從「對抗共產主義」轉到了「歷史終結」。
從「冷戰」轉到了「獨大」，從「中國」轉到了「中東」。
But at the same time, the United States lost its greatest geopolitical rival.
America’s attention shifted from “containing communism” to “the end of history.”
From the Cold War to unchallenged global dominance, and from China to the Middle East.
13
1991 年 1 月，海灣戰爭。
美國用壓倒性的軍力，在 42 天內擊敗伊拉克。
這場戰爭給世界看了一個信號：美國的軍事霸權，進入了「無人可敵」的時代。
蘇聯解體加上海灣戰爭，美國進入單極時刻。
January 1991: the Gulf War.
The United States used overwhelming military power to defeat Iraq in just 42 days.
The war sent a clear message: American military dominance had entered an era with no serious rival.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, combined with the Gulf War, marked the beginning of America’s unipolar moment.
14
中國呢？
中國 1991 年的 GDP，還不到美國的十五分之一。
中國軍費只有美國的三十分之一。
中國科技基本還是「跟跑」階段。
And China?
In 1991, China’s GDP was still less than one-fifteenth that of the United States.
Its military spending was only about one-thirtieth of America’s.
Its technological base was still largely in catch-up mode.
15
中國能怎麼辦？
只能示弱。不是想示弱，是只能示弱。
What options did China have?
It had to keep a low profile. Not because it wanted to, but because it had little other choice.
16
第四步：韜光養晦。
鄧小平給接班人留下了一句戰略遺囑：
冷靜觀察、穩住陣腳、沉著應付、韜光養晦、善於守拙、決不當頭、有所作為。
這就是後來被稱為「韜光養晦」的二十八字戰略。
Step Four: “Hide Your Capabilities, Bide Your Time.”
Deng Xiaoping left behind a strategic guideline for his successors:
“Observe calmly, secure our position, deal with affairs calmly, hide our capabilities and bide our time, maintain a low profile, never claim leadership, and accomplish something where possible.”
This later became known as the “28-character strategy.”
17
接班的年輕領導，完整執行了這個戰略。
接下來三十年，中國對外的姿態是：我們是發展中國家，我們不挑戰任何人。
我們需要和平的國際環境發展經濟，我們不爭霸，我們不當頭。
The younger generation of leaders followed this strategy closely.
For the next thirty years, China’s message to the world was: We are a developing country, and we are not here to challenge anyone.
We only need a peaceful international environment to develop our economy; we do not seek hegemony or leadership.
18
而西方呢？
西方真心相信中國會變成「弱小、馴服、可被改造」的對象。
And the West?
The West genuinely believed China would become weak, cooperative, and ultimately liberalizing.
19
這就是接下來三十年的核心戲。
西方接觸派真心相信中國會走上自由化、民主化、市場化的道路。
跨國公司相信中國市場會永遠開放。
學者智庫推動「接觸促變」，華爾街覺得中國是搖錢樹，矽谷把中國當成下一個大市場。
This became the central drama of the next thirty years.
Supporters of engagement in the West genuinely believed China would move toward liberalization, democratization, and a market system.
Multinational corporations believed the Chinese market would remain permanently open.
Think tanks promoted “transformation through engagement,” Wall Street saw a financial opportunity, and Silicon Valley saw the next great market.
20
三十年裡，西方做了它認為對自己最有利的事。
中國也做了它認為對自己最有利的事。
兩邊都很真誠，兩邊都認為自己在贏。
Over those thirty years, the West did what it believed was best for itself.
China also did what it believed was best for itself.
Both sides were sincere, and both sides believed they were winning.
21
三十年下來，結果是什麼？
中國從 GDP 不到美國十五分之一，變成了 GDP 世界第二。
中國從「跟跑」變成了「並跑」，某些領域變成了「領跑」。
中國製造業規模超過美日德總和。
中國有了自己的衛星導航、空間站、高鐵、5G、支付體系、AI 以及整套基礎設施。
Thirty years later, what was the result?
China went from a GDP less than one-fifteenth of America’s to becoming the world’s second-largest economy.
It moved from catching up to competing side-by-side, and in some sectors, taking the lead.
China’s manufacturing capacity surpassed that of the U.S., Japan, and Germany combined.
China developed its own satellite navigation, space station, high-speed rail, 5G, digital payments, AI, and integrated infrastructure.
22
三十年下來，西方驚醒了。
但中國已經成型。
After thirty years, the West finally woke up.
But China had already become something very different from what the West expected.
23
這就是 1989 拐點的真正份量。
不是六四，不是鄧陳齊退，不是韜光養晦。
而是所有這些動作合起來，構成了一場跨越三十年的世紀大局。
This is the true significance of the 1989 turning point.
It was not simply about the events of 1989, the retirement of Deng and Chen, or “hiding capabilities.”
It was the combination of all these moves that created a strategic transformation lasting more than three decades.
24
這場大局裡，有幾個值得想的問題。
第一：鄧陳同時退，真的是巧合嗎？
第二：選江、李、朱、胡這四個沒有個人魅力的接班人，真的是巧合嗎？
第三：蘇聯散和中國示弱，在時間上的精準對接，真的是巧合嗎？
第四：韜光養晦三十年，西方完全沒看穿，真的只是西方笨嗎？
這些問題，小雷只是列出來，請你自己想。
Within this larger process, several questions are worth considering.
First: Was it really a coincidence that Deng and Chen retired at the same time?
Second: Was it really a coincidence that successors without strong personal charisma were selected?
Third: Was the timing between the collapse of the USSR and China’s low-profile strategy accidental?
Fourth: Did the West genuinely misunderstand what was unfolding over those thirty years?
Tiger Lyon is only placing the questions on the table for you to consider.
25
而這個三十年大局裡，還有一個動作，特別值得擺一下。
從 1989 年之後，中國開始送出一批又一批留學生。
1990 年，出國留學人數約 3,000 人，到了 2019 年，超過 70 萬人。
三十年累計，超過 600 萬中國學生出國留學。
他們去美國、英國、加拿大、澳洲、日本、德國的頂級大學。
Within this thirty-year strategy, there was another move worth noting.
After 1989, China began sending wave after wave of students overseas.
In 1990, about 3,000 students went abroad; by 2019, that number exceeded 700,000.
Over three decades, more than six million Chinese students studied overseas.
They attended top universities in the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, Japan, and Germany.
26
由於中國人天生勤勞、聰明、刻苦耐勞，這些年輕的中國人來到美國，不僅是為了尋求夢想，更是為美國帶來了巨大的繁榮和很多好處。他們在科學實驗室裡通宵達旦，在矽谷研發核心代碼，在華爾街分析複雜數據。美國過去三十年的技術爆炸與經濟增長，很大程度上得益於這群中國年輕人的貢獻。
Because Chinese people are naturally industrious, intelligent, and resilient, these young Chinese individuals who came to the United States brought immense prosperity and numerous benefits to the country. They worked tirelessly in scientific laboratories, developed core code in Silicon Valley, and analyzed complex data on Wall Street. America’s technological explosion and economic growth over the past thirty years have benefited significantly from the contributions of these young Chinese talents.
27
這批人真心地融入西方。
他們很多人真心地批評中國，擁護西方價值觀，認為自己已經是「西方人」。
西方也真心地接納他們。
三十年下來，這批人在西方體系內坐到了關鍵位置。
These people genuinely integrated into Western society.
Many of them sincerely criticized China, embraced Western values, and came to see themselves as part of the Western world.
The West genuinely welcomed them as well.
Thirty years later, many of them had risen to important positions within Western institutions.
28
而同樣三十年下來，中國的科技、產業、創新也完成了跨越。
這兩件事有沒有關係?
小雷不下結論，只擺一個歷史對應：
100 年前，清朝精英送出了第一批留學生，他們成了二十世紀中國大事的核心。
1989 年之後，中國新的精英階層送出了第二批留學生。
兩批人做的事看起來不一樣，但結果都是：中華文明完成了某種知識和能力的重大轉移。
Yet during those same thirty years, China’s technology, industry, and innovation also made a great leap.
Was there a connection?
Tiger Lyon will not offer a conclusion, only a historical parallel:
One hundred years ago, the Qing elites sent out the first wave of students who became central to twentieth-century China.
After 1989, a new generation of elites sent out a second wave.
While their actions differed, the outcome was the same: a major transfer of knowledge and skills for Chinese civilization.
29
100 年前的清朝精英，知道自己在做什麼。
1989 年之後的中國精英，可能也知道自己在做什麼。
留學生們呢? 這個留給讀者自己想。
The Qing elites of a century ago knew what they were doing.
The Chinese elites after 1989 may also have known what they were doing.
As for the students themselves? That is left for the reader to judge.
30
1989 拐點到 2020 年代，整整三十多年。
在這三十多年裡，中國從一個「示弱」的發展中國家，變成了一個「不裝了」的世界主要力量。
而世界，沒有準備好應對這個變化。
From the 1989 turning point to the 2020s, more than thirty years passed.
During that period, China transformed from a developing country that kept a low profile into a major global power that no longer felt the need to hide.
And the world was not prepared for this transformation.
31
這個變化什麼時候發生?
也許就在最近這幾年。
接下來幾卷，小雷會擺一些具體的拐點。
從 1993 年的銀河號，到 2008 年的金融危機，到 2018 年川普第一次貿易戰，到 2025 年雙拐點之年。
中國「不裝了」這個過程，是怎麼一步一步走完的，請繼續看下去。
When exactly did this change happen?
Perhaps only in the past few years.
In the next chapters, Tiger Lyon will lay out several specific turning points.
From the Yinhe Incident in 1993, to the 2008 financial crisis, to the 2018 trade war, and finally to the double turning-point year of 2025.
The process by which China gradually moved away from its low-profile strategy unfolded step by step. Please continue reading.